quinta-feira, 31 de março de 2011
quarta-feira, 30 de março de 2011
terça-feira, 29 de março de 2011
quarta-feira, 23 de março de 2011
segunda-feira, 21 de março de 2011
Relátório de Mercado - FOCUS - 18/03/2011
Foi publicado relatório de mercado da pesquisa FOCUS do Banco Central que investiga com o mercado as perspectivas para o PIB, Inflação, Câmbio, entre outras váriáveis econômicas importantes.
A expectativa para o PIB em 2011 é de 4,03% e é a 4ª semana consecutiva de queda dessa expectativa.
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/GCI/PORT/readout/R20110318.pdf
A expectativa para o PIB em 2011 é de 4,03% e é a 4ª semana consecutiva de queda dessa expectativa.
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/GCI/PORT/readout/R20110318.pdf
sexta-feira, 18 de março de 2011
Caminhando na direção certa
Jornal DCI - Opinião - Antonio Delfim Nettoé professor emérito da FEA-USP
http://www.dci.com.br/noticia.asp?id_noticia=366178&&utm_source=akna&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ONN+-+Minera%E7%E3o%2C+Siderurgia+e+Metalurgia+-+2010+%2818%2F03%2F2011%29
http://www.dci.com.br/noticia.asp?id_noticia=366178&&utm_source=akna&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ONN+-+Minera%E7%E3o%2C+Siderurgia+e+Metalurgia+-+2010+%2818%2F03%2F2011%29
quinta-feira, 17 de março de 2011
terça-feira, 15 de março de 2011
segunda-feira, 14 de março de 2011
Como Dilma vê o mundo - Revista Isto é
Em apenas três meses, a presidente coloca uma marca própria na condução da política externa e elege a China como o maior desafio diplomático do governo
Revista Isto Éhttp://www.istoe.com.br/reportagens/128070_COMO+DILMA+VE+O+MUNDO
sexta-feira, 11 de março de 2011
quinta-feira, 10 de março de 2011
BC divulga Ata da 157ª reunião do Copom
O Banco Central divulgou a Ata da 157ª reunião do Copom, realizada nos dias 01 e 02 de março de 2011, onde o COPOM decide elevar a taxa Selic para 11,75%a.a, ou seja, um aumento de 0,5p.p em relação a taxa anterior.
Integra da Ata em:
http://www.bcb.gov.br/?COPOM157
Integra da Ata em:
http://www.bcb.gov.br/?COPOM157
terça-feira, 8 de março de 2011
The Economist - Killing off the monster: A new attempt to explain market inefficiency
HAVING lived through the financial crisis of 2007-08, the man in the street might find the idea that markets are “efficient” incredible. But the efficient-market hypothesis, like a Hollywood monster, has proved very hard to kill off.
From the truism that the average investor could not beat the market after costs, academics developed the insight that obvious market-beating opportunities would quickly be arbitraged away. Market prices were thus the best available estimate of the underlying value of securities and should not be second-guessed by regulators. The good news is that this hypothesis led to the development of low-cost index-tracker funds. The bad news is that it led central banks to sit idly by while asset bubbles inflated.
In the past 20 to 30 years, the behavioural-finance school has been chipping away at the efficient-market hypothesis. Far from being hyper-rational actors, expertly analysing all available information and discounting future cashflows at the optimal rate, individual investors show psychological biases, such as being more willing to take profits than cut their losses. In short, they are more like Captain Kirk than Mr Spock.
Furthermore, markets have displayed a number of anomalies, of which the most startling is momentum—the tendency for share prices that have recently outperformed to keep rising—that are hard to square with the idea of efficiency.
A new book* by Roman Frydman of New York University and Michael Goldberg of the University of New Hampshire tries to steer a third way between the efficient and behavioural schools. They build on an insight of John Maynard Keynes: the factors governing the success of any future investment are too complex to be calculable. Investors face a world marked by “known and unknown unknowns”, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, a former American defence secretary.
The problem is not just that investors do not know how the fundamentals—profits, interest rates and so on—will develop. They also do not know which things other investors will choose to focus on at different times. For example, a study of Bloomberg news stories showed that only 5% mentioned inflation, which was then unusually low, as a factor driving asset prices between 2001 and 2003. By 2005, when inflation had gone back up again, this proportion had risen to 45%.
The authors argue that investors develop strategies to deal with this uncertainty. As the fundamentals change they adjust their forecasts slowly. In the late 1990s, for example, the economic background appeared very favourable, with growth buoyant, inflation low and profits rising strongly. It was hardly irrational that these strong fundamentals were translated into sharply rising stockmarkets.
Eventually, however, equity valuations reached very high levels. Investors realised the danger and started to adjust their behaviour. The result was the sharp stockmarket correction of 2000-02.
The authors call this the “contingent-market hypothesis”, which they summarise as follows: “The causal process underpinning price movements depends on available information, which includes observations concerning fundamental factors specific to each market. This process cannot be adequately characterised by an overarching model, defined as a rule that exactly relates market outcomes to available information up to a fully predetermined random error at all time periods, past, present and future.”
This is not exactly catchy. Nor is it clear whether the concept will deliver testable predictions by which it can be judged.
Nevertheless the book has one eminently practical implication—that central banks should intervene to limit excessive asset-price swings on the upside, just as they have on the downside. The authors suggest the authorities should announce a (very broad) market range and act if prices move beyond it. Practical measures could involve higher margin or collateral measures for those taking bullish bets.
With regard to the housing bubble of the past decade, the authors argue that official guidance on prices, allied to higher capital requirements for mortgages, would surely have caused the market to self-correct at an earlier stage. Amen to that. The idea that central banks should do nothing, even as speculative investors borrow money from banks to bid prices up to unprecedented levels, deserves a stake through the heart.
* “Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk and the Role of the State”, by Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg. Princeton University Press
http://www.economist.com/node/18233432
From the truism that the average investor could not beat the market after costs, academics developed the insight that obvious market-beating opportunities would quickly be arbitraged away. Market prices were thus the best available estimate of the underlying value of securities and should not be second-guessed by regulators. The good news is that this hypothesis led to the development of low-cost index-tracker funds. The bad news is that it led central banks to sit idly by while asset bubbles inflated.
In the past 20 to 30 years, the behavioural-finance school has been chipping away at the efficient-market hypothesis. Far from being hyper-rational actors, expertly analysing all available information and discounting future cashflows at the optimal rate, individual investors show psychological biases, such as being more willing to take profits than cut their losses. In short, they are more like Captain Kirk than Mr Spock.
Furthermore, markets have displayed a number of anomalies, of which the most startling is momentum—the tendency for share prices that have recently outperformed to keep rising—that are hard to square with the idea of efficiency.
A new book* by Roman Frydman of New York University and Michael Goldberg of the University of New Hampshire tries to steer a third way between the efficient and behavioural schools. They build on an insight of John Maynard Keynes: the factors governing the success of any future investment are too complex to be calculable. Investors face a world marked by “known and unknown unknowns”, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, a former American defence secretary.
The problem is not just that investors do not know how the fundamentals—profits, interest rates and so on—will develop. They also do not know which things other investors will choose to focus on at different times. For example, a study of Bloomberg news stories showed that only 5% mentioned inflation, which was then unusually low, as a factor driving asset prices between 2001 and 2003. By 2005, when inflation had gone back up again, this proportion had risen to 45%.
The authors argue that investors develop strategies to deal with this uncertainty. As the fundamentals change they adjust their forecasts slowly. In the late 1990s, for example, the economic background appeared very favourable, with growth buoyant, inflation low and profits rising strongly. It was hardly irrational that these strong fundamentals were translated into sharply rising stockmarkets.
Eventually, however, equity valuations reached very high levels. Investors realised the danger and started to adjust their behaviour. The result was the sharp stockmarket correction of 2000-02.
The authors call this the “contingent-market hypothesis”, which they summarise as follows: “The causal process underpinning price movements depends on available information, which includes observations concerning fundamental factors specific to each market. This process cannot be adequately characterised by an overarching model, defined as a rule that exactly relates market outcomes to available information up to a fully predetermined random error at all time periods, past, present and future.”
This is not exactly catchy. Nor is it clear whether the concept will deliver testable predictions by which it can be judged.
Nevertheless the book has one eminently practical implication—that central banks should intervene to limit excessive asset-price swings on the upside, just as they have on the downside. The authors suggest the authorities should announce a (very broad) market range and act if prices move beyond it. Practical measures could involve higher margin or collateral measures for those taking bullish bets.
With regard to the housing bubble of the past decade, the authors argue that official guidance on prices, allied to higher capital requirements for mortgages, would surely have caused the market to self-correct at an earlier stage. Amen to that. The idea that central banks should do nothing, even as speculative investors borrow money from banks to bid prices up to unprecedented levels, deserves a stake through the heart.
* “Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk and the Role of the State”, by Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg. Princeton University Press
http://www.economist.com/node/18233432
sexta-feira, 4 de março de 2011
Statement by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the Conclusion of His Visit to Brazil
Press Release No. 11/65
March 3, 2011
Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued the following statement today in Brasília at the conclusion of his visit to Brazil:
“It has been a great pleasure to visit Brazil and meet President Dilma Rousseff, as well as minister Guido Mantega and new central bank governor Alexandre Tombini. I thank them for productive discussions, and the Brazilian authorities for their kindness and hospitality.
“Brazil today embodies many of the challenges confronting emerging market economies. According to figures just released today, the country grew 7.5 percent in 2010, its fastest rate in 25 years. That is an impressive recovery from the 2008–09 crisis and demonstrates that sound economic management over the last decade has increased the resilience of the Brazilian economy to external shocks.
“That resilience is mainly based on the three pillars of fiscal responsibility, inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate, as well as a skillful use of countercyclical policies during the crisis. A relatively favorable international environment, particularly ample international liquidity and high commodity prices, meant Brazil was able to effectively contain the negative effects of the crisis.
“However, new challenges arise from the success of recent years. In the short term, it will be important to set an appropriate policy mix to contain inflationary pressures and ensure sustainable economic growth over the medium-term, while managing the challenges associated with large capital inflows.
“Over the medium-term, the key challenge is to raise the growth potential of the economy and continue to make progress towards the reduction of poverty and inequality, so as the current prosperity lays the foundation for sustained economic growth that will benefit future generations and help more and more Brazilians to raise above poverty. In this regard, I’d like to highlight four areas where I think the country could make significant advances: 1) tax reform, to increase investment and growth; 2) reducing budget rigidities to help improving public finance management; 3) social security reform, to ensure the long-term sustainability of the regime and create greater incentives for private savings; and 4) improving the business environment, to support Brazil’s plans to boost the potential growth of the economy.
“Given the still challenging external environment, it will be crucial that Brazil continues to play a key role in the international arena, particularly in the G-20. Continued international cooperation is needed to solve global imbalances (such as large and volatile capital flows, exchange rate pressures), prevent future crisis, and avoid individual country measures that could hurt the global recovery. It would be particularly important to resist trade protectionism measures.
“I would like to add that the Fund supports President Rousseff’s emphasis on working towards continuing to reduce poverty in Brazil. There have been substantial improvements in this area over the last decade, which have also been associated with an impressive expansion of the middle class. To know that Bolsa Família is being copied in many countries, including the United States speaks volumes about the program’s positive social impact and macroeconomic solidity.
“Finally, I would like to note that a distinguished Brazilian public servant, Murilo Portugal, steps down tomorrow as Deputy Managing Director of the IMF to return to his home country. On behalf of the IMF and its 187 country members, I would like to thank Mr. Portugal for his service to the international community.”
Fonte: IMF
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr1165.htm
March 3, 2011
Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued the following statement today in Brasília at the conclusion of his visit to Brazil:
“It has been a great pleasure to visit Brazil and meet President Dilma Rousseff, as well as minister Guido Mantega and new central bank governor Alexandre Tombini. I thank them for productive discussions, and the Brazilian authorities for their kindness and hospitality.
“Brazil today embodies many of the challenges confronting emerging market economies. According to figures just released today, the country grew 7.5 percent in 2010, its fastest rate in 25 years. That is an impressive recovery from the 2008–09 crisis and demonstrates that sound economic management over the last decade has increased the resilience of the Brazilian economy to external shocks.
“That resilience is mainly based on the three pillars of fiscal responsibility, inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate, as well as a skillful use of countercyclical policies during the crisis. A relatively favorable international environment, particularly ample international liquidity and high commodity prices, meant Brazil was able to effectively contain the negative effects of the crisis.
“However, new challenges arise from the success of recent years. In the short term, it will be important to set an appropriate policy mix to contain inflationary pressures and ensure sustainable economic growth over the medium-term, while managing the challenges associated with large capital inflows.
“Over the medium-term, the key challenge is to raise the growth potential of the economy and continue to make progress towards the reduction of poverty and inequality, so as the current prosperity lays the foundation for sustained economic growth that will benefit future generations and help more and more Brazilians to raise above poverty. In this regard, I’d like to highlight four areas where I think the country could make significant advances: 1) tax reform, to increase investment and growth; 2) reducing budget rigidities to help improving public finance management; 3) social security reform, to ensure the long-term sustainability of the regime and create greater incentives for private savings; and 4) improving the business environment, to support Brazil’s plans to boost the potential growth of the economy.
“Given the still challenging external environment, it will be crucial that Brazil continues to play a key role in the international arena, particularly in the G-20. Continued international cooperation is needed to solve global imbalances (such as large and volatile capital flows, exchange rate pressures), prevent future crisis, and avoid individual country measures that could hurt the global recovery. It would be particularly important to resist trade protectionism measures.
“I would like to add that the Fund supports President Rousseff’s emphasis on working towards continuing to reduce poverty in Brazil. There have been substantial improvements in this area over the last decade, which have also been associated with an impressive expansion of the middle class. To know that Bolsa Família is being copied in many countries, including the United States speaks volumes about the program’s positive social impact and macroeconomic solidity.
“Finally, I would like to note that a distinguished Brazilian public servant, Murilo Portugal, steps down tomorrow as Deputy Managing Director of the IMF to return to his home country. On behalf of the IMF and its 187 country members, I would like to thank Mr. Portugal for his service to the international community.”
Fonte: IMF
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr1165.htm
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